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Chapter 1
Introduction
Systemic risk can be defined as the risk contributing to the collapse of an entire
financial system or market, as opposed to the risk associated with any one individual
entity. It refers to the risks imposed by interdependencies in a system or market, where
the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading failure, which
could potentially bankrupt or bring down the entire system or market.
Over the past years, thanks to financial innovation and deregulation, financial system
has become more integrated and interconnected giving origin to a thick network of in-
terdependences among institutions. While such changes are inevitable consequences of
prosperity and economic growth, they are accompanied by certain consequences, including
the build-up of systemic risk.
Because the integration of financial markets progresses rapidly, regulators and supra-
national agencies become increasingly worried about systemic risk in the financial sector.
Of particular interest is the identification of the financial institutions that contribute the
most to the overall risk of the financial system; these institutions are called Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).
Many measures have been developed to rank financial companies and to find out
SIFIs; the main ones assess the contribute of a particular company to the health state
of the whole system. Because of their features, they lack informations about how the
externalities move through the system. In this work we seek to map a systemic risk
network throughout the global financial system in order to understand where systemic
risk mainly lays and which companies are the most vulnerable to this risk. To map the
connections we use the Granger causality test between companies returns.
We start by reviewing the past literature most closely concerning our work (Chapter
2). We then describe the methodology (Granger causality test) used to map the network
and the data selection. Our dataset is formed by 10 years price series of 406 financial
companies (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 we show the networks and we describe the main
features of them. We compute both a network on the whole sample and a “dynamic”
network using rolling window analysis. Then we try to forecast distressed periods through
the network measures (Chapter 5). At the end we sum up the main findings with some
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concluding remarks (Chapter 6). In the final Appendixes we provide further informations
on variables and some results of the final analysis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The following chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature for the cause
of this work. We start to explain what systemic risk means and why it is important to
monitor it. Next we present the main systemic risk measures developed in the last years.
We can define systemic risk as the possibility that an event at the company level could
trigger severe instability or collapse an entire industry or economy; Investopedia (2016).
Even though it can concern any economic sector, the financial one is, probably, the most
vulnerable sector. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) present a survey where they explain
why financial sector is more exposed than others to this class of risk. They highlight three
main characteristics of banking sector:
1. The structure of banks. The health of a bank not only depends on its success in
picking profitable investment projects for lending but also on the confidence of each
depositor about the others will not run the bank.
2. The interconnection of financial institutions through direct exposures and settlement
systems.
3. The information intensity of financial contracts and related credibility problems.
When uncertainty increases or the credibility of a financial commitment starts to
be questioned, market expectations may shift substantially and “individually ratio-
nally” in short periods of time and so may investment and disinvestment decisions.
For example, this can lead to large asset price fluctuations, whose sizes and some-
times also directions are virtually impossible to explain through “fundamental”
analysis alone.
Due to its nature, financial institutions present both strongly relationships with the other
economic sectors, both strongly connections among them. Because of the high degree of
connections, financial sector is one of the best ways to spread a crisis.
Let us turn on systemic risk. The website SystemicRiskHub (2016) delivers to us a
more comprehensive explanation about this concept:
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“Systemic risk generally refers to the risk of a disruption to the flow of
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial
system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences on the real
economy.”
This definition gives us the idea that the risk is induced by a shock in the financial sector
that hits firstly itself and, next, spillovers in the real economy. In addition:
“Systemic risk arises when the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities
can cause a cascading failure, due to the size and the interconnectedness of in-
stitutions, which could potentially bankrupt or bring down the entire financial
system.”
The latter sentence sheds light on the existence of some “dangerous” entities for the
system. The events from 2007 to 2009 witness that the bankrupt of some large financial
institutions may impair the whole financial system. In particular, the fail of Lehman
Brothers bank undermined the stability of the economies of the most developed countries
in the world. Because of these fact, the literature about systemic risk have increased
significantly due to the risen interest of supervisory authorities in this topic.
Accordingly, after the crisis, the regulators have sought to individuate the companies
that, with their risk exposures, could jeopardize the whole economy. These enterprises
are called systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs). A common definition
of SIFIs is given by Daniel Tarullo1:
“Financial institutions are systematically important if the failure of the
firm to meet its obligations to creditors and customers would have significant
adverse consequences for the financial system and the broader economy”.
This definition is useful because it highlights two important ideas: firstly, the risk arise
from a firm in financial distress; secondly, the crisis must spillover and hit financial system
and real economy. The definition, however, misses a key feature of systemic risk. Systemic
risk should not be described in terms of financial firm’s failure, but in the context of a
firm’s overall contribution of systemic risk; Acharya et al. (2012).
In order to regulate SIFIs and to monitor the spillovers due to distressed situations of
these financial institutions, regulators need a measure to assess the systemic risk contri-
bution of each financial institution. Many works show empirical evidences about as the
most used and mainstream risk measure, value-at-risk (defined as the maximum loss at a
given level of confidence), is not able to capture the consequence of the bankrupt of a cer-
tain financial institution. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) describe requirements for a systemic
risk measure. It should identify the risk on the system by individually systemic insti-
tution. Allen (2001) specify the importance of mapping out relations between financial
1Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board
5institution when studying financial fragility and systemic risk. Herein we will present the
most significant measure. Bisias et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive survey of systemic
risk measures. They choose the most relevant measures from different point of views and
present concise definitions and inputs required in order to estimate the measures.
Let us open a bracket about different approaches used to measure systemic risk and
in which one this work is suitable. Billio et al. (2012) divide the empirical literature,
focused on the systemic risk, in three groups. (i)The first group looks at the systemic
risk as bank contagions and it is based on the autocorrelation of the number of banks
default, bank returns, fund withdrawals. A survey of these works is provide by De Bandt
and Hartmann (2000). (ii)The second group involves studies of banking crisis, aggregate
fluctuations and lending boom. These studies rely on bank capital ratios, bank liabilities
and macroeconomic variables. (iii)The third group focuses on contagions, spillover effects
and join crashes in financial markets. These works are based on econometrics models and,
because this work is closer to this group, we will focus on the main models linked with
this approach.
In order to highlight the contribution of each financial institution to systemic risk,
Acharya et al. (2011) present an economic model based on systemic expected shortfall
(SES). It measures how much institutions are undercapitalized when the whole system is
undercapitalized as well. In their theoretical framework, the vulnerability of the financial
system arise because firms do not take into account the negative externalities that they
generate in a crisis. Banks that take excessive risk will face higher costs of capital but
will not be charged for the externalities that they impose on the others companies. In
order to compute the SES, they use the extreme value theory since a systemic crisis
is an “extreme tail” event. They use the power law to compute the relation between
exceptional events and normal events; Gabaix (2008). SES is defined as a linear function
of another measure, marginal expected shortfall (MES), that corresponds to a firm’s
expected equity loss when market falls below a certain threshold over a given horizon.
In the end the authors suggest a solution aimed to restrict externalisation: each bank
should be taxed proportionally to its probability of default, expected losses given default,
probability of systemic crisis (undercapitalization of the whole financial system) and the
bank’s contribution to systemic crisis (measured through SES).
Brownlees et al. (2016) focus on the expected shortfall and they provide an extended
measure of MES: SRISK. It corresponds to the expected capital shortfall of a firm, con-
ditional on a severe market decline (long run MES). SRISK is developed in order to take
into account both the liabilities and the size of the financial institution. The companies
with the largest capital shortfall are assumed to be the greatest contributors to the crisis
and they are the institutions considered the most systemically risky. The measure can
be computed using balance sheet informations and an appropriate LRMES estimator.
In their work, the authors assume that LRMES follows a GARCH-DCC model; Robert
(2002). They investigate whether aggregate SRISK (sum of individual SRISKs) provides
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early warnings signals of worsening macroeconomic conditions. They find that SRISK
captures several of the early signs of the crisis.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) develop a measure called ∆CoVaR. The ∆CoVaR of
a specific firm is defined as the difference between VaR of the financial system conditional
on this particular firm being in financial distress and the VaR of the financial system con-
ditional on the firm being in median state. To define the distress of a financial institution,
the authors consider a situation where the loss is exactly equal to its VaR. In this work,
it is showed the low correlation between VaR and ∆CoVaR that implies the weakness of
the VaR to measure systemic risk. They compute ∆CoVaR through a quantile regression
Koenker (2013), there are alternative approaches to get it though. For example, Girardi
and Tolga Ergu¨n (2013) estimates it through multivariate GARCH models, Mainik and
Schaanning (2014) use copulas and Bernardi et al. (2013) use Markov switching model. In
the quantile regression used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), VaR of the firm is the
external variable, whereas VaR of the system is the endogenous variable. Afterwards, the
authors provide an out-of-sample forecast forward-looking measure. The authors run a
regression where ∆CoVaR is the endogenous variable, whereas some lagged characteristics
of the company are the external variables (size, leverage, maturity mismatch). They find
systemic risk is built in the background during seemingly tranquil times, when volatility
is low.
Benoit et al. (2012) deliver a survey where they compare these measures (MES, SES,
SRISK, ∆CoVaR) in a common theoretical framework (bivariate GARCH-DCC). They
express these measures as functions of market risk indicators. Afterwards they present an
empirical comparison where they show how each measure gives different SIFIs (defined as
top ten most risky firms). On average, the percentage of concordant results between MES
and SRISK is 18.9%; that one between SRISK and ∆CoVaR is 9.9% whereas between MES
and ∆CoVaR is 43%. They try to find also the causes of divergence of these measures.
The authors discover that the ranking of the companies according to beta (systematic risk
measure) is similar to that one according MES and a strong dependence exist between
SRISK and leverage situation, whereas ∆CoVaR has a strong correlation with VaR. The
last findings sounds inconsistent compared to that said above but the authors justify the
correlation as a direct consequence of the quantile regression method used to generate the
∆CoVaR. In conclusion they say each measure capture a different facet of systemic risk
and a univocal measure does not exist yet.
We can recall also Huang et al. (2012), that develop a systemic risk indicator relied on
the price of insurances against systemic financial distress from credit default swap prices.
Lehar (2005) and Gray and Merton (2007) use contingent claims analysis to measure
systemic risk.
It is worth to underline that the previous measures highlight the relationships between
the institutions and the whole system but they do not give us many informations about in
which channels the spillovers flow from the SIFIs to the system. A tool that can be used
to design a net of relationships is the graph. In empirical financial literature Mantegna
7(1999) introduces the use of the graphs to analyse the connections between the assets of
a portfolio.
Billio et al. (2012) use graphs to draw the connections in financial sector. They use
principal component analysis and Granger causality (linear and non linear) to map the
interconnections between returns of financial institutions. They split the financial sector
in four sub-sectors (banks, insurances, hedge funds and broker companies) and then they
measure the connections between these classes. Principal component analysis shows the
presence of connections among all four groups of financial institutions. From Granger
causality test, they find that the causality among returns of different groups, has increased
during the crisis of 2007 - 2009 and hedge funds is the class most influenced by the other
ones. They run also Granger causality test for the 25 most capitalized companies of each
sector and map the connections. From this test they find an increase of these connections
after 2000. Their results suggest that banking and insurance sectors may be more heavy
sources of systemic risk than hedge funds and brokers. Another finding is that regulation
is based to assess the soundness of individual firm (VaR aproach) and it may amplify
aggregate fluctuations instead to reduce the risk.
Another work on the use Granger causality networks is Vy´rost et al. (2015). They
model the complex relationships of spillovers between returns on 20 developed stock mar-
kets around the world and then they show the main measures to describe the graphs.
They find that most influential returns stem from European stock markets, American
influence decline after the financial crisis and the network’s connections are quite stable
in time.
About this work we can say our analysis is close to Billio et al. (2012) for what
concerns methodology but we analyse a broader sample and our aim is to mapping the
interconnection (Granger causality) between companies, geographical zone and financial
sub-sectors. In the next chapter 3 we present the data and the methodology used to
find the relationships. In the chapter 4 we show our findings and we compute the main
measures to analyse networks. In the chapter 5 we try to use the measures gotten in the
chapter 4 to predict the distressed periods.
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Chapter 3
Methodology and Data Selection
In this chapter we illustrate the methodology and the data used for create the network
among financial institutions. We start to present Granger causality from a theoretical
point of view and then we apply the idea to a vector autoregressive process (VAR). In
the last part we show the main features of the data.
3.1 Methodology
In order to understand the propagation of systemic risk and which financial institutions
are most vulnerable to this kind of risk, we believe that in addition to individuate SIFIs,
it is important to find out the connections between the institutions. So our aim is to map
a network among global financial companies. To represent a network we use a graph that
can be defined as a set of objects (in our case they are the financial institution) in which
some pairs of objects are “related”. We say two firms are connected if one of them causes
(in Granger meaning) the other one. Even though we have not defined Granger causality
yet, we can say that this kind of causality is directional. Indeed if institution A Granger
causes B, it is not due (but not excluded) that B Granger causes A.
3.1.1 Granger Causality
Let us define the Granger causality; Granger (1969). Suppose that we have a process
Y , and yk is the value assumed by the process in time k. Now assume that we want to
predict the value yt+h based on the information set Ft. We minimize the mean square
error (MSE)
minE[(yt+h − yˆt+h)2] (3.1)
and we obtain that the best predictor, written as yˆt+h, is E[yt+h|Ft]. Let us define another
process, X. The process X is said to cause Y in Granger’s sense if the following inequality
is true for at least one h ∈ N:
E[(yt+h − E[yt+h|Ft])2] < E[(yt+h − E[yt+h|Ft/{xs}])2] (3.2)
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where s ≤ t. We can rewrite the same inequality with X and Y inverted to check the
causality in the other direction; Lu¨tkepohl (2005). In other words, we can say that if a
process can be predicted more efficiently if another process is taken into account in the set
of relevant information, then the second process causes the first one in a Granger sense. It
is worth to underline that from this definition, Granger causality does not mean causality
in the deep sense of the word. Indeed it means only that a process can be used to forecast
another process even though the real cause may be different. This may happen because
real causes manifest themselves earlier rather in a process than in another one; Sørensen
(2005).
Now we have a theoretical idea about what Granger causality does mean, but we have
to put in practice the definition. A relevant practical problem is the choice of information
set Ft. Usually all the relevant information in the universe is not available to a forecaster,
and, the optimal predictor given Ft cannot be determined. Therefore a less demanding
definition of causality is often used in practice. Furthermore we simplify the definition
taking in account only the linear dependences between processes. In the following, we use
the Granger causality with these restrictive assumption if not otherwise noted.
3.1.2 VAR Model
Suppose now to describe process X and Y by a bivariate vector autoregressive model
of order p (VAR(p)) in order to capture the cross-dependence. Let us define Z = [XY ]′.
We can represent the model in the following way:
zt = c+
p∑
i=1
Φizt−i + εt (3.3)
where z. = [x. y.]
′, c is a vector 2×1 that represents the intercepts, Φi is a matrix 2×2
and εt is the vector of innovations 2×1.
If we rewrite the 3.3 in an extended way, we obtain the following equation:
zt =
[
xt
yt
]
=
[
cx
cy
]
+
[
φ
(1)
1,1 φ
(1)
1,2
φ
(1)
2,1 φ
(1)
2,2
][
xt−1
yt−1
]
+
[
φ
(2)
1,1 φ
(2)
1,2
φ
(2)
2,1 φ
(2)
2,2
][
xt−2
yt−2
]
+ . . .
· · ·+
[
φ
(p)
1,1 φ
(p)
1,2
φ
(p)
2,1 φ
(p)
2,2
][
xt−p
yt−p
]
+
[
t
ut
]
(3.4)
Also assume the following innovations’ covariance matrix
Σε =
[
σ2 σu,
σu, σ
2
u
]
In this model it is quite clear that X does not Granger cause Y if φ
(i)
2,1=0 for every
3.2. DATA SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 11
i = 1, 2 . . . p; otherwise we can say that X cause Y . Likewise we can check Granger
causality in the other direction (from Y to X) on φ
(i)
1,2.
In order to carry out the model, we run two multiple linear regressions for each pair
of series to assess the interconnections in both directions. Let us assume that we want
to assess whether or not company X Granger causes company Y . We run the following
regressions:
yt = β0 + β
X
1 xt−1 + β
X
2 xt−1 . . . β
X
p xt−p + β
Y
1 yt−1 + β
Y
2 yt−2 . . . β
Y
p yt−p + t (3.5)
For each regression we test the null hypothesis:
H0 : β
X
1 = β
X
2 = . . . β
X
p = 0
In order to do that we use a F-test, so we have to compute also the restricted regression:
yt = β0 + β
Y
1 yt−1 + β
Y
2 yt−2 . . . β
Y
p yt−p + t (3.6)
and from the results of the two regressions we obtain the following value:
F =
(
SSR1−SSR2
p2−p1
)
(
SSR2
n−p2
)
Where SSR1 and SSR2 are, respectively, the sum of squared residuals of the restricted
model (3.6) and the the sum of squared residuals of the unrestricted model (3.5). p2 and
p1 are the number of the estimated parameters of the restricted model and unrestricted
model whereas n is the number of observations. The value F has an Fisher-Snedecor
distribution, with (p2 -p1, n-p2) degrees of freedom.
1 The null hypothesis is rejected if
the F calculated from the estimated regressions is greater than the critical value of the
F-distribution for some desired false-rejection probability (in our case 1%).
3.2 Data Selection and Descriptive Analysis
In this section we focus on the selection and the features of the data used for our
analysis. Since we want to map the interconnections among global financial system, we
need a broad sample of financial companies. From the STOXXr Global 1800 index we
extract every financial institutions. We use this index as proxy of the global market
even though, in research, it is common to use S&P 500 as proxy of the market. In
this work we try to give a more globalized view of the market. Indeed this index is
composed by other three indexes: STOXXr Asia/Pacific 600, STOXXr Europe 600 and
1The Fisher-Snedecor distribution or F-distribution is defined as a ratio between two χ2 distributions.
For this reason, F-distribution has 2 different degrees of freedom.
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STOXXr North America 600 that are formed by the 600 major companies (in sense of
market capitalization) of the related regions. All these indices are weighted according to
free-float market capitalization. In total we have 406 financial companies split in four
sub-sectors: banking, financial services, insurances and real estate. In order to avoid the
possible problem of overlapping due to different time zone, we use weekly returns (natural
log-difference between prices: log(Pt)− log(Pt−1)). Our sample cover a time window from
March 2007 to February 2017. The data are obtained by Eikon Datastream. In order to
reorganize the data, we can divide these stocks in twelve groups described by the sectors
and geographical locations. So we have Asian banks, American banks, European banks,
Asian insurance companies, American insurance companies, and so on.
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Figure 3.1: Each index is capitalizations-weighted and are provided from STOXXr. AP
is Asian/Pacific, EU is Europe, NA is North America, BNK is Banking, INS is insurance,
FS is financial services and RE is real estate.
In the table 3.1 it is possible to see the main parameters of these groups. Our list of
banks is composed by 105 institutions (37 from Asia, 44 from Europe and 24 from North
America). Banking is the sub-sector with the lowest average yearly performance and if we
divide the sector according to the geographical position of the institutions, only American
banks have a strong positive average return even though it remains the lowest one among
American sectors. Asian banks present a return around 0 whereas European banks is the
worst index with an average yearly performance close to -5%.
Financial services sector is the most profitable (6,57% average yearly return). We have
86 companies (20 from Asia, 29 from Europe and 37 from North America). If we split
the information we can see that the major contribute comes from American companies.
Indeed in Europe and in Asia this sector has an average return around 2%.
Insurance sector, composed by 81 companies (13 from Asia, 36 from Europe and 32
from North America ) and Real Estate sector, 134 companies, (67 from Asia, 30 from
Europe and 37 from North America) have similar features. Both have positive average
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return and in Europe they present the weakness average returns.
To sum up we can say in that European indexes present the worst performances, Amer-
ican ones present the best performances whereas Asian indexes are the lowest volatile.
These findings are consistent with the features of STOXXr Asia/Pacific 600, STOXXr
Europe 600 and STOXXr North America 600.
If we take a look to the picture 3.1, about the paths of normalized prices, we can
see that they present negative trends until first quarter 2009. Then they start to rise
but they show difference growth rates. North America presents the highest one, whereas
Europe is the lowest one. About sectors we see that insurance, real estate and financial
services present similar paths and they are very close to get the initial level of price. On
the contrary banking sector presents a more flatten path.
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Name Sample size Num of stocks Y Mean Y St Deviation Min Max Median Skewness Kurtosis
Global 1800 522 1800 5,85% 18,32% -13,88% 11,75% 0,19% -0,75 7,61
North America 600 522 600 8,50% 19,72% -14,88% 11,16% 0,26% -0,66 7,38
Europe 600 522 600 1,75% 20,82% -13,48% 13,56% 0,18% -0,59 6,44
Asia/Pacific 600 522 600 2,68% 18,81% -15,54% 10,47% 0,25% -0,90 7,39
Asian Banks 522 37 0,86% 24,35% -16,37% 11,31% 0,26% -0,61 6,09
Asian Real Estate 522 67 2,70% 23,75% -12,54% 17,11% 0,17% -0,17 6,09
Asian Insurances 522 13 0,15% 28,01% -26,71% 13,36% 0,32% -1,11 10,02
Asian Financial Services 522 20 2,42% 27,85% -17,17% 13,58% 0,29% -0,50 5,30
European Banks 522 44 -4,97% 33,61% -24,20% 24,31% 0,03% -0,47 7,53
European Insurances 522 36 1,63% 29,89% -19,84% 17,13% 0,27% -0,56 6,79
European Financial Services 522 29 2,27% 26,97% -16,54% 17,43% 0,37% -0,51 6,81
European Real Estate 522 30 -0,54% 25,78% -17,95% 14,32% 0,22% -0,71 7,27
American Financial Services 522 37 7,00% 31,15% -20,58% 19,46% 0,21% -0,33 7,04
American Real Estate 522 37 5,41% 30,40% 18,74% 28,56% 0,28% 0,02 9,72
American Insurances 522 32 5,92% 26,55% -18,87% 17,13% 0,25% -0,67 8,28
American Banks 522 24 5,35% 35,89% -24,00% 27,53% 0,00% -0,07 8,38
Banks 522 105 1,15% 28,15% -16,90% 21,05% 0,09% -0,40 7,25
Insurances 522 81 4,09% 25,32% -17,10% 15,76% 0,28% -0,68 7,95
Real Estate 522 134 3,96% 21,98% -14,70% 11,72% 0,19% -0,62 6,39
Financial Services 522 86 6,57% 26,79% -16,62% 15,15% 0,17% -0,45 6,43
Table 3.1: These indexes are capitalizations-weighted and are provide from STOXXr. They are formed using the stocks contained in the Global
1800. About the measures, the mean is the average yearly performance calculated as the arithmetic mean of the yearly geometric means of the
weekly returns. The yearly Standard Deviation is calculated using weekly Standard Deviation multiplied for the square of 52 (weeks in a year).
Min, max, skewness and Kurtosis are referred to the weekly returns
Chapter 4
The Network
In this chapter we want to bring on the light the connections among global financial
institutions through linear Granger causality test and then to use the output to map the
network. At the beginning we seek to find the best model that fits our data. Next we
analyse, through linear Granger causality test, relationships among the twelve indexes in
order to be aware about what we may expect from the next analysis. In the second part
we run Granger test for every possible pair of stocks’ returns. The latter part is split
in two parts. In the first one we suppose a static environment, so we run the Granger
causality test on the whole sample obtaining a static network. In the next one we run
Granger causality on 96 rolling windows (the width is two years) and we look at the
change of the connections and at the modifications of the network over time.
4.1 Model Selection and Preliminary Analysis
In this section we prepare data and carry out descriptive analysis. In order to choose
the lags in our VAR model, we look at the partial correlogram of each asset return series.
In the picture 4.1, we can see autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation related at the
first, second and third lag of each series. It is evident that the correlation (both partial,
both total), related at the first lag, lays mostly outside of the confidence bounds, so, in
general, it is significantly different from zero. They present mostly negative autocorrela-
tion. About the next lags (second and third) we can say they are quite well enclosed in the
confidence bounds and thus the correlation is not statistically significant. Furthermore
we use Bayesian Information Criterion to select the number of lags. We find that in 350
out of 406 cases the best model has one lag, in 34 cases has two lags, in 11 cases has
3 lags and in other 11 cases the best model has more than 3 lags. In order to simplify
the calculation we use the same model for every series and, for this reason, we choose to
adopt a bivariate VAR(1) model to analyse the interdependences between series.
Before to start the calculation of the connections among individual companies, we run
the Granger causality test among the twelve groups. We want to shed some light on the
macro relations existing between geographical areas and between financial sub-sectors.
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Figure 4.1: Autocorrelation and partial correlation related at first,second and third lags
of every company.
In order to do that, we use two approaches. The first one is run using a VAR(1) model
with twelve variable, the latter is run using a VAR(1) model for each pair of variables.
The networks are showed in the following figures (figures 4.2 and 4.3). They concern
respectively the first and the second approaches.
Network related to the multivariate VAR(1) model
  Asian Banks
  Asian Real Estate
  Asian Insurances
  Asian FinSer
  European Banks
  European Insurancs
  European FincSer
  European Real Estate
  American FinSer
  American Real Estate
  American Insurances
  American Banks
Figure 4.2: Network related to the multivariate VAR(1) model
Observing the two graphs, we can see that Asian insurances, in both models, is the
group that influences more others. If we look at the most vulnerable groups, we get
two different results. When we run one VAR(1) model with twelve variable, we see that
American groups are a little more vulnerable than the others, but the differences are
contained. Instead, when we run bivariate VAR(1) model for each pair of group, (66
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Network related to the bivariate VAR(1) models
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Figure 4.3: Network related to the bivariate VAR(1) models
models), we obtain that Asian sectors are very exposed to American and European ones.
According to both models European sectors are the less vulnerable.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
The results of the previous section give us an initial insight about what we can ex-
pect from the next analysis: Asian stocks are the most influenced by others and Asian
insurances is the most “dangerous” sub-sector for others. In this section we analyse in a
deeper way the connections and we deduce the network among companies. We split this
analysis in two part: in the first one we analyse the network on the whole sample, in the
second one we try to understand how the network change over time running the test on
rolling windows wide 24 months.
4.2.1 Static Model
In order to draw the network, we run a bivariate VAR(1) model for each pair of return
series. We add to the model also the Stoxx Global 1800 index returns as background
variable with the aim of capturing the comovements of the stocks’ returns due at the
external causes that affect the whole market. To estimate the model, for each pair of
stocks, we run two multivariable linear autoregressions to identify Granger causality in
both directions. We use HAC covariance matrices of parameter estimators to avoid het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation inconsistency; Andrews (2012). The last stage is to
check which parameters are significantly different from zero (level of confidence at 99%).
Because of the large amount of nodes and connections, we believe that to draw the
network is not the most straightforward way to represent the connections. The figure 4.4
shows the connections of the network through the adjacency matrix. It is defined as a
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Figure 4.4: Representation of the adjacency matrix related to the network among in-
stitutions (connections are from columns to rows). The red lines delimit the different
groups.
matrix n×n (n is the number of nodes) where each element may be 0 or 1. If the element
in the i-th row and j-th column is equal to 1, the i-th element is Granger caused by the
j-th element. Otherwise, if it is equal to zero, there is no any Granger causality. In the
picture,the blue points are the connections. In the picture 4.4 there are some red lines.
They divide the companies according to their sector and geographical area. For the names
of each company, look at the appendix A.
From the picture, we can see that some areas are more dense than others and the most
noticeable is that North American companies have strong influence on Asian companies
and in general Asian companies are more weak than how much they are dangerous for
the others. It is noteworthy to notice the presence of some vertical “line” formed by the
points. They are the above mentioned SIFIs. We can see someone particularly evident
in European financial services companies, in Asian real estate companies, in European
banks, and so on. Another odd feature about this plot is that on the main diagonal
(from the left top to the right bottom) we cannot see any particular strong presence
of clusters of points. It means that spillovers are global and not circumscribed in the
geographical/sector areas.
In order to understand where the network presents more connections, let us look at
the picture 4.5that shows the proportions of significant causal relationships out of possible
connections in each area delimited by the red lines. We see what we said above: Asian
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Figure 4.5: Rate of connections over possible connections in the different areas
companies are the most influenced and in some areas we find out picks about 15% of
connections. American companies contribute for the most part.
Now let us turn on SIFIs. To identify them, we rank the companies for number of
connections that they have to other companies (this measure is called centrality). Our
finding is in the figure 4.6. The company with the higher number of relationships is the
Belgian insurance company Ageas ex Fortis. The second one is the Australian real estate
company Investa Office found. Three out of five most ranked companies are from Europe,
in addition to the above mentioned company, we have Bank of Ireland and Investec
(British company related to financial services). The others are two Asian real estate
companies (beside Investia we have Kenedix office investment based in Japan). If we
look at American firms, we notice that the most dangerous ones are quite lower than the
top rank non American companies, but they present on average higher centrality. Thus,
event though they do not have the most connected firms, they have the highest number
of connection. On relative terms, they present 3.8% of connection, whereas European and
Asian ones have respectively just 2.5% and 2.3%.
Suppose now to have a firm (called A) that Granger causes a lot of small companies
and another one (called B) that Granger causes just one but very big one. Of course if
the sum of the value of the small companies is lower than the value of the big company,
we will say that B is more dangerous than A for the system. Thus, instead of looking
at the number of companies connected from each company, we look at the sum of the
market capitalization of the companies connected from each company. The results are in
the figures 4.7 and 4.8. The first picture (4.7) is very similar to the previous one (4.6).
The top firms are exactly the same (with some different positions) and also in this case we
see the same features on American companies. In the picture 4.8 we rank the institution
according to the ratio between how many euros they influence and their capitalization.
This index give us the informations about where one euro of capitalization may cause
more damages. In this case we have a little different view of the ensemble. Indeed the
American institutions do not present the same features. They have a very low index of
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risks because of their high capitalization. For the rest, the findings are quite similar. The
worst firm is Investa Office Fund followed by Kenedix Office Investment.
Harmonic centrality is another interesting measure. It takes into account the shortest
path from a certain company to others, and, more the value is high, more the company
influences the others. Since we use normalized harmonic centrality, it lay in the interval
[0,1]. If it is equal to 1, it means the company is connected whit everyone by one step, in
the opposite case the company do not influence any other company. The formula to get
this measure is the following one:
H(x) =
1
N − 1
∑
y 6=x
1
d(y, x)
(4.1)
where N is the number of the nodes, d(y, x) is equal to the minimum distance between
the node x and the node y or it is 0 if there is no path from x to y. In the picture 4.9 we
see the levels for every firm. The worst companies are the same of the other measure, but
this time we see that on average, the companies have similar harmonic centrality between
0,3 and 0,4.
Since the prices of the securities are in different currencies, it might be that some
causalities between security returns are due to some valuation or devaluation between
different currencies. For this reason we recompute the model but this time we convert all
prices in euro and, after that, we obtain the returns from these prices. When we run the
regressions between every pair of assets, instead of to use market index as explanatory
variable, we use the exchange rate between the currencies of the two ones (where they are
difference). The results are presented in the appendix B.
The figure B.1 shows the adjacency matrix. It has a density of connections of 4.22%
(in the previously model it was 2.87%) and it is mainly observable in the upper area.
Indeed, in this model, Asian companies present a strong dependence on American ones
and European ones. The Asian sector less influenced is real estate one. European real
estate firms and American banks show the lowest influence on Asian companies.
In the charts B.2, B.3, B.4, it is possible to see the placements of the SIFIs by different
criteria (number of connection, amount of capitalizations connected with the company and
amount of capitalization connected over the capitalisation of the company), they are a bit
different from the others charts. This time we have European companies with a central
role. Indeed, in addition to having the three most centrality companies (Bank of Ireland,
Ageas ex Fortis and Investec), they have 4.15% connections whereas Asian companies
have 2.18% and American companies have 4.12%. The other features are similar to the
previous model.
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Figure 4.6: Number of connections for each company. The red line is the 95th percentile. The highest central companies are from Asia and
Europe but American companies present an higher centrality on average.
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Figure 4.7: Amount of euros influenced by each company. The red line is the 95th percentile. The highest central companies are from Asia and
Europe but American companies present an higher centrality on average.
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Figure 4.8: Amount of Euros connected to each company over market capitalization. The red line is the 97th percentile. The highest central
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Figure 4.9: Harmonic centrality of each company.
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4.2.2 Dynamic Model
Let us move on the dynamic model. We want to study how the network behaves
over the years. In order to do that, we apply Granger causality test over 24-months
rolling windows for a total of 96 sub-samples. We run the test using market returns as
background factor. Because we believe that it is more efficacious than exchange rates to
capture the largest common shocks that might distort our results. For each sub-sample,
we compute a Granger cause network, so we have 96 adjacency matrices that are showed
in appendix C. It is noteworthy to clarify that the label used to refer each sub-sample,
is the last month of the sub-sample. Hereafter we use Network (first letter uppercase) to
indicate the Network on the whole sample, and network (first letter lowercase) to indicate
a network concerned to a sub-sample. So we can say that the Network is formed by all
the networks.
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Figure 4.10: 4 out of 96 adjacency matrices
The figure 4.10 delivers us only the adjacency matrices of 4 out of 96 networks related
to the following sub-samples: May 2007-April 2009, December 2009 - November 2011,
August 2012 - July 2014 and April 2015 - March 2017. It is clear that the Network
presents different features over time, indeed among these four adjacency matrices we
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cannot recognize any similarities. So we can say that the Network is not a static entity,
but it changes radically over time.
If we look at the adjacency matrices related to the full sample in appendix C, we can
see that, at the beginning, American companies (except banks) have strong influence on
Asian companies and also the presence of some SIFIs among European financial services
and real estate companies1. The less “dangerous” sectors are European real estate and
American banks. The density of the Network increase with stable characteristics until
fall 2010. In November 2010 we can see two clusters of connections: American companies
influence Asian companies and both Asian real estate companies and both European
banks influence American companies.
At the beginning of 2011, the density of the Network drops down and we cannot see
any huge clusters of points. American banks get more influence on other American sectors
and the last ones cease to have strong influence on Asian companies. In 2013 the density
starts again to grow up moderately and we see clusters of connection due to American
real estate and, after that, from Asian real estate companies. From the end of 2014 to
the summer 2015, European banks increase their influence on other sectors, probably this
fact is due to the European debt crisis. The final networks deliver us a situation where
Asian companies and European financial services are the most exposed to other sectors.
Anyway the density of the last networks are much lower than the density of the first
networks.
To check out the Network’s density, we can also look at the figure 4.11, it shows the
trends of the percentage of the number of connections over the total possible connections
in each sub-sample.
According the figure 4.11, the percentage of connections was larger during the financial
crisis (around 2.75%) and, after 2010, it falls down at the minimum (about 1%) and then it
stabilizes around 1.5%. We can associate the first period at the sub prime mortgages crisis
when spillovers due to Lehman Brothers failure spread among global financial system.
This findings are consistent with Billio et al. (2012), they find that during distressed
periods their network presents higher concentration. For this reason we are surprising to
not notify any high level of connection during the European debt crisis (2010-2014). If
we look at the sectors’ trends, we see that, especially at the beginning of the sample, real
estate companies have the lowest ratio. This feature was unexpected inasmuch real estate
sector was the most hit during the crisis.
In order to analyse the strength and the stability of the connections in the Network,
we present in the figure 4.12 the average connections surviving rates over time. The
firs panel of the figure shows that the Network is quite persistent until 3 steps forward.
After one step the average survival ratio of edges is still around 70%, after 3 steps, the
1In an adjacency matrix SIFIs are recognized as vertical lines of dots. Indeed if we had a company
that Granger causes all other companies, we would find a perfect vertical line. If the line are horizontal,
the company is Granger caused by all the other companies.
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Figure 4.11: Number of connections as a percentage of all possible connections. We have
total trend and sectors’ trends.
survival ratio is around 50%. It is worth to mark that our sub-samples overlap, so part
of information used to map a certain network, is used also to map the close networks.
Since the sub-samples are width 104 weeks, and each step is 4 weeks forward, in order
to have two sub-sample not overlapping we have to look at 26 steps forward, the ratio of
surviving among not overlapping windows is close to zero. In the second panel of figure
4.12 it is plotted the time-varying survival ratios for 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 steps forward. It
is readily observable that in the first part of the sample the Network presents a stable
ratio of surviving, after the crisis (December 2010) the ratios drop down. In this period
the Network goes through an outstanding alteration. Indeed at the same period, as the
picture 4.11 can witness, the Network reduce drastically its density. After that, we have a
little rising at the beginning of 2012. It is possible to observe other little falls in September
2013 and 2016. If we look the connections’ surviving ratios related to 10 and 15 steps
froward, we see that later 2010 they do not get a significant level, whereas the connections’
surviving ratios related to 1, 2 and 5 steps reach a significant level, not as earlier 2011
though. This fact witnesses the Network’s higher propensity to change after 2010.
Another measure of Network’s structure, that it is worth to analyse, is assertativity
or assortative mixing; Newman (2002). This index disclosures if the Network’s nodes are
mainly connected with similar nodes or not. In order to say if a pair of nodes are similar,
it is possible to use any characteristic observable in the nodes. In this work we use the
assortative mixing by degree. This variant classifies the nodes according to their centrality
degree. This is a particular form because it measures the structure of the Network on
another Network’s measure. For example, in a network that shows positive assortative
mixing by degree, the high-degree vertices will be preferentially connected with other high-
degree vertices, and the low ones with the low ones. If we think to a social network, we
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Figure 4.12: Network’s stability and connections’ strength
have positive assortative mixing by degree if the gregarious people are friends with other
gregarious people and the hermits with other hermits. Conversely, we have disassortative
(or negative assortative) mixing by degree, which would mean that the gregarious people
were hanging out with hermits and vice versa; Newman (2010). Assortativity is defined
in the following manner:
r =
∑
jk jk(ejk − qjqk)
σ2q
(4.2)
where qk is the probability that, chosen a random edge, the node connected to it has
k connections over the edge chosen (k + 1 total connections), ejk is the joint probability
distribution: it disclosures the probability that an edge links a node with j+1 connections
and a node with k + 1 connections. The denominator normalizes the index between -1
and 1. In absence of assortativity, since the nodes are connected in a “random” way,
the joint probability is equal to the product between the two probabilities. If we have a
positive (negative) correlation between the centrality degree of nodes connected, we have
that joint distribution is higher (lower) than the simple product of probabilities.
In the figure 4.13 we can see how Network’s assortativity changes over the sample.
Since this case we have negative assortativity, we can say that there are some insti-
tutions with high centrality degree connected with other institutions with low centrality
degree (figure 4.13). This is consistent with our findings because we have some central
institutions (SIFIs) linked to peripheral companies. This measure is quite stable since
the index is negative during the whole sample, even though, after the first period, the
measure increases its volatility. Indeed after 2012 it fluctuates between -12% and -30%
whereas before it was stably around -20%.
A particularly relevant topic about financial institutions, is the presence of “too big
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Figure 4.13: Network’s assortativity. It shows nodes with high centrality degree are more
connected with nodes with low centrality degree
to fail” companies. This concept refers to those companies that have a significant capital-
ization and, if they are in distress, they may create distress to an huge share of economy.
So we can say it is a concept very close to SIFI concept. In this part we look for any
relation between centrality and market capitalization. We can start with the following
chart (figure 4.14).
Figure 4.14: Scatterplot between harmonic centrality and market capitalization
In this figure, each point refers to a certain institution in a certain time window.
The coordinates are the harmonic centrality and the average capitalization in a certain
sub-sample. Each colour concerns a company2. From the picture we cannot see any
positive relation between harmonic centrality and market capitalization but we can claim
that over a threshold of capitalization, the harmonic centrality is quite bounded. If we
compute the regression, we have a significant negative relation but with the R2 close to
zero. These results are quite coherent with the previous findings since during the crisis
(low capitalization) we found high degree of density in the Network (high centralities) and
2Actually MatLab does not have 406 colours, so we can say that each bundle of points of the same
colour is referred to a certain company.
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after the crisis (rising capitalizations) we have a drop of the Network density (decreasing
of centrality level). We can look at the data from an other point of view. The figure
4.15 shows the highest level of harmonic centrality and harmonic centrality of the most
capitalized company in each network.
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Figure 4.15: Comparison of harmonic centrality between the highest capitalizated com-
panies and the highest centralized companies
The figure 4.15 claims that the centrality degree of the most capitalized company
follows approximately the median of the centrality degree. The violet bars show the per-
centage of the capitalization of the company with the highest level of centrality over the
highest capitalization. We see that at the beginning it is around %20 and it has a decreas-
ing trend. After that period we have a low percentage until 2015, when the centrality of
the highest capitalized company drop to zero and the percentage of the capitalizations
rises on the maximum of 30%. Whit the rising of the centrality the percentage drops
again. On the light of these two charts we cannot claim that high level of market value
involve in high level of centrality.
Now let us turn on the centrality. In this part we want to rank the companies in
order to understand which ones are the most central and the most systemic relevant. To
do that we use two approaches. In the first one, we just compute the average harmonic
centrality for each company and we take the 9 highest ones, In the second approach we
rank the institutions giving more weight to the highest position: to do that we take in
account only the companies that appear in the centrality three highest positions at least
in a network and after this first selection we choose the highest 9. In this way we have
two groups of companies and comparing them is useful to understand if the centrality hub
of the Network is stable or change over time. The 9 comapnies from the first approach
are the following (in the bracket the average harmonic centrality and the sector): Com-
merzbank (33,43% German bank), Tokio Marine Holdings Inc (31,34% Japanese financial
services), Admiral Group(31,04% British insurance), Hachijuni Bank (30,41% Japanese
bank), Gunma Bank (30,29% Japanese bank), Investa Office Fund (30,24% Australian
real estate), Realty Income Corporation (29,64% American real estate), Kenedix Office
Investment Corp (29,6% Japanese real estate), Komercni banka(29,03% Czech bank). We
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have 5 Asian companies, 4 Europeans and only one American. We see that their harmonic
centrality is bounded between 33,34% and 29,03% and, taking in account that the average
maximum centrality degree in the sub-samples is 50,96%, they do not present particularly
high values. In the picture 4.16 we can see the path of these companies.
We see that at the beginning (during financial crisis) we have Investa Office Fund,
Commerzbank and Gumma bank as the most central institutions and all of the 9 stocks
present high centrality. After this period the centrality drops down except for Admiral
Group that is the central hub of the Network for almost two years. In the last part the
centralities are bounded with some peaks of Commerzbank. During the sample, all of
them present some falls to zero.
Let us show the results of the second approach (where the companies must be present
in the centrality highest positions at least in one sub-sample to be selected).
In this case 2 companies out of 9 are present also in the previous group (Admiral
Group and Investa Office Fund). The other companies of the second group are Investec
(28,26% British financial services), Mid-America Apartment Communities (28,15% Amer-
ican real estate), Ageas (28,10% Belgian insurance), Aeon Mall (24,14% Japan rela es-
tate), Deutsche EuroShop (22,74% German real estate), Bankia(14,35% Spanish bank)
and Jupiter Fund Management (11,93% British financial services). In this case real estate
is the dominant sector and Europe is the region where most of central companies are
located. If we look at the average percentage of the second group, we can notify that the
first 5 institutions are as central as the companies of the first group. Instead, the others,
are much lower than the others with the minimum 11,9%. This fact disclosures that the
most centrality point in the Network is not a static point but it is in constant movement.
Indeed we can see at the beginning of the sample Ageas, Investec and Investa Official
Fund are the most central companies. After these companies, we find Admiral Group
followed by Mid-America Apartment Communities, Aeon Mall, Deutsche EuroShop (real
estate peak). At the end we have Bankia and Jupiter Fund Management.
To sum up the findings in the dynamic model, we can say that the central hub of
the Network is a mutable “point” as witnessed by the differences among the adjacency
matrices of the sub-samples. In addition we can say that in this research we do not find any
strong correlation between market capitalization and centrality and the highest central
institutions have low capitalization whereas the highest capitalized have a centrality close
to the median. Other features of the Network are that it is more dense and more stable
during financial crisis. After 2010 it has a period of instability and low density.
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Chapter 5
Crisis Prediction Powers of the
Network Measures
In this chapter we want to assess whether or not any systemic risk measure, related
to the Network, can provide us some early warning signals about distressed periods.
To do that we use a similar approach used in Billio et al. (2012). In their work, the
authors construct an array of indicators based on the Granger causality network. Then,
they consider two 36-month samples, October 2002 – September 2005 and July 2004 –
June 2007, as estimation periods in which systemic risk measures are estimated, and the
period from July 2007 – December 2008 as the “out-of-sample” period encompassing the
Financial Crisis of 2007 – 2009. To evaluate the predictive power of these measures, they
firstly compute the maximum percentage financial loss suffered by the 100 most capitalized
institutions during the crisis period, then they rank all these financial institutions from
1 to 100 according to the maximum loss. At the end they estimate linear regressions
using maximum loss rankings as dependent variable and the institutions’ systemic risk
measures rankings as explanatory variables.
In the first section we identify crisis periods and we calculate some systemic risk
measures related to the networks. They are computed over the periods before crisis. In
the second section we run some linear regressions in order to individuate how systemic
risk measures can predict the stock performances during a crisis.
5.1 Systemic Risk Measures
Because in our work we use 24-months sub-samples and since our sample starts during
the crisis, we do not have any sub-sample anterior to the financial crisis to monitor the
systemic risk indicators. Thus we make do with using as proxy of crisis the weeks in
which ones the market presents the lowest returns. In this work we define these proxies
as that moments when the market returns fall below his first percentile (-7,76%). From
the figure 5.1 we see that it happens 5 times but we cut off all those ones that lay in the
first sub-sample (first 2 years). So we use only the last 2 distressed periods (first week of
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Figure 5.1: Selection of the distressed periods: when the market returns fall under the
first percentile
August 2011 and third week of August 2015).
As estimation periods, in which we estimate the array of systemic risk measures, we
use the last available 24-months sub-sample before the distressed periods. (August 2009 -
July 2011 and August 2013 - July 2015). From the networks related to the 2 sub-samples,
we compute the systemic risk measures, but, before to present them, we would recall
some aspect of networks. Networks can be described also through adjacency matrices.
We can define an adjacency matrix for a directed network1, assembled by n nodes, as
the matrix An×n of which elements are 0 or 1. If the element ai,j is equal to 1, the j-th
node is connected with i-th node, otherwise there is no connection from j-th node to i-th
node. In our adjacency matrices, the rows are Granger caused by the columns, so if ai,j
is equal to 1, j-th company Granger cause i-th company. For each financial institution,
we compute the following set of systemic risk measures:
1. Number of connections “In” (In): the number of institutions that Granger cause
this financial institution. This measure related to the k-th company is computed in
the following way:
Ink =
N∑
j=1
ak,j
2. Number of connections “Out” (Out): the number of institutions that are Granger
caused by this financial institution. This measure related to the k-th company is
computed in the following way:
Outk =
N∑
i=1
ai,k
1Directed network means that if the node A is connected with B, it is not due that B is connected
with A
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3. Number of connections “In + Out” (InOut): the sum of “In” and “Out” connections.
This measure related to the k-th company is computed in the following way:
InOutk =
N∑
i=1
ai,k +
N∑
j=1
ak,j
4. Number of connections “In from others” (Info): the number of financial institutions
that Granger cause this financial institution and that do not lay in his same group
(geographical and sectoral groups). This measure is similar to the first one (In) with
the particularity to cut off the interconnection bounded in the same group of this
company. For example, if we measure it on an American bank, we take in account
only the connection that the company has with the other companies that are not
enclosed in the group American banks.
5. Number of connections “Out to others” (Oto): the number of institutions that are
Granger caused by this financial institution and that do not appertain to his group.
This measure is similar to the second one (Out) with the same restriction of the
previous measure (Info).
6. Number of connections “In from others + out to others” (InOto): the sum of “In
from other” and “Out to other” connections.
7. “Closness” (Clos): is the average shortest path from this institution to others using
only the connections “out”. This measure related to the k-th company is computed
in the following way:
Closk =
1
N − 1
N∑
y 6=k
d(y, k)
where d(y, x) is equal to the minimum distance (using only “out” connections)
between the company k and the company y or to 0 if there is no path from k to y.
8. “Closness using both directions” (Closb): is the average shortest path from this
institution to others using both kinds of connections: “in” and “out”. This measure
related to the k-th company is computed in the following way:
Closbk =
1
N − 1
N∑
y 6=k
db(y, k)
where db(y, x) is equal to the minimum distance (using both “in” both “out” con-
nections) between the company k and the company y or to 0 if there is no path from
k to y.
9. Harmonic centrality (Hh): it is described in the section 4.2.1. To sum up we can
say that this measure gives us an idea about how the company is connected, taking
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in account the minimum path from the node to the others. This measure related to
the k-th company is computed in the following way:
Hhk =
1
N − 1
N∑
y 6=k
1
d(y, k)
10. Average market value (mv): it is the average capitalization during the sub-samples.
This measure is the only one not related to the Network.
Now we have 9 systemic risk measures plus the average market capitalization for each
company. In the next section we use these measures to predict the companies that suffer
highest losses during the crisis.
5.2 Regressions
For each systemic risk measure, financial institutions are ranked from 1 to 406: we
assign 1 to the company with the highest value of the measure, 2 to the second one, and so
on. These rankings are our explanatory variables in the linear regressions. As dependent
variable we use the ranking according the returns during the distressed periods. We give
1 to the company that present the highest return, 2 to the second one, and so on. It is
worthy to underline that all measures are ranked in a decreasing way. This fact will help
us to analyse the outputs of regressions. Regarding the market value of companies, we
do not rank it but we employ this measure in the natural logarithm. This choice is due
to the fact that we do not want to cut off the huge difference in capitalization among
institutions.
We use HAC variance to avoid heteroscedasticity problems and, because some pairs
of indexes (“In” and “Info”, “Out” and “Oto”, “InOut” and “InOto”) present high level
of correlations, we run separate regressions in order to avoid collinearity bias.2 Therefore
the regressions that we run are the following:
Returns = β0 + β1In + β2Out + β3InOut + β4Clos + β5Closb + β6Hh + β7Log(mv)
Returns = β0 + β1Info + β2Oto + β3InOto + β4Clos + β5Closb + β6Hh + β7Log(mv)
Each regression is run 3 times. One using only the data of the first sub-sample, one using
only the data of the second sub-sample and one using data of both sub-samples. In the
table 5.1 we present the results related to three regressions computed using “In”, “Out”
and “InOut”. The sub-samples are labelled with the years related to the crisis. In table
5.2 we present the results of the regressions using “Info”, “Oto” and “InOto”.
2We run the VIF (variance inflation factor) on the array containing all the measures. We find low
levels of VIF when we split the pairs.
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2011+2015 2011 2015
Name Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
intercept 15,94 0,66 6,41 0,90 61,99 0,33
In -0,08 0,25 -0,17 0,08 * -0,03 0,76
Out -0,12 0,31 -0,11 0,46 -0,13 0,45
InOut 0,44 0,00 *** 0,66 0,00 *** 0,14 0,45
Clos -0,02 0,63 -0,07 0,25 0,014 0,79
Closb 0,21 0,00 *** 0,48 0,000 *** -0,15 0,16
Hh -0,01 0,95 -0,06 0,58 0,05 0,71
ln(mv) 10,49 0,00 *** 6,02 0,09 * 16,05 0,00 ***
adjusted R2 4,93% 12,4% 4,83%
R2 5,85% 14,1% 6,64%
Table 5.1: Results of the multi regressions using “In”, “Out” and “In + Out” rankings.
The stars indicate the level for which we refuse the null hypothesis: * 10%, ** 5% and
*** 1%
2011+2015 2011 2015
Name Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
intercept 19,30 0,59 42,42 0,37 23,66 0,71
Info -0,09 0,22 -0,18 0,06 * -0,05 0,60
Oto -0,13 0,21 0,01 0,96 -0,34 0,02 **
InOto 0,41 0,00 *** 0,451 0,00 *** 0,40 0,01 ***
Clos -0,02 0,65 -0,08 0,19 0,03 0,61
Closb 0,18 0,00 *** 0,35 0,00 *** 0,03 0,98
Hh 0,01 0,88 -0,081 0,39 0,15 0,17
ln(mv) 11,18 0,00 *** 6,97 0,06 * 13,94 0,00 ***
adjusted R2 4,62% 8,79% 7,23%
R2 5,54% 10,6% 8,99%
Table 5.2: Results of the multi regressions using “In from others”, “Out to others” and
“In from others + Out to others” rankings. The stars indicate the level for which we
refuse the null hypothesis: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%
In the first case, if we use data from both sub-samples, we find that, on average,
the companies with high capitalization, high closeness degree (computed using both kind
of connections) and high level of connections “InOut” present higher losses during the
distressed periods. It is consistent with the fact that more a company is close to others,
more is exposed to spillovers and more probably it will suffer during distressed periods.
These findings are significant also using data of the first sub-sample, capitalization loses
significance though. In the last regression, capitalization presents again high significance
but all the other parameters lose significance. So from these index we can say that “In”,
“Out”, “Clos” and “Hh” do not give any contribution to predict crisis, whereas “Closb”,
“InOut” and the logarithm of market value give some helps to predict risk. The results
presented in the second table are similar to the first table. Indeed in the first panel
we have that companies that present high capitalizations, high closeness degree (in both
directions) and high “InOto” index risk to suffer higher losses during crisis. Also in the
second panel we find the same results of the table 5.1. In the third panel (last sub-sample),
we see that the parameters related to “InOto” and “Oto” are significant different from
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0. From this first analysis we can say that the the logarithm of average capitalization,
“Closb” and “InOto” indexes are the measures that have more predictive power. This
findings give us the idea that in our Network both directions matters (In and Out).
Let us recompute the regressions, but this time we estimate a regression for each
measure using the logarithm of average capitalization as background factor. In the table
5.3 are presented our findings.
From the results, it is clear that capitalization is the most significant variable in order
to predict which companies will suffer huge losses during distresses periods. Among risk
measures we find that if we split up the sample, the closeness index is significant in both
samples even though in the first sample the parameter is positive, in the second one is
negative. So we cannot deduce how it influence the crisis. If we look at the regression run
using the index “In + Out”, the related parameters are significant in the first case and
in the last one. In the second case we cannot refuse the null hypothesis at the 5% level,
but the the p-Value is just 8% and the three estimated parameters are similar. According
these results, “In+Out” index is the most significant systemic risk measure to predict
which company will suffer highest losses during crisis. It is noteworthy to say that, on
average, the regression that use “closeness in both directions” and “In + Out” indexes
present highest R2 even though they are quite low.
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2011 + 2015
Name Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
intercept 58,44 0,05 57,00 0,06 46,66 0,12 58,23 0,05 55,95 0,06 44,66 0,13 75,56 0,01 75,65 0,01 60,28 0,04
ln(mv) 13,05 0.00 13,04 0,00 12,88 0,00 13,13 0,00 13,20 0,00 13,14 0,00 13,11 0,00 13,48 0,00 13,01 0,00
In 0,06 0,08
Out 0,07 0,04
InOut 0,13 0,00
Info 0,061 0,09
Oto 0,07 0,05
InOto 0,13 0,00
Clos -0,03 0,37
Closb -0,03 0,29
Hh 0,05 0,15
adjusted R2 2,58% 2,44% 3,71% 2,26% 2,41% 3,67% 1,98% 2,03% 2,16%
R2 2,56% 2,71% 3,97% 2,53% 2,68% 3,93% 2,25% 2,3% 2,43%
2011
Name Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
intercept 82,53 0,05 73,56 0,07 63,28 0,13 98,99 0,02 71,32 0,08 70,11 0,09 85,67 0,03 67,84 0,08 77,56 0,06
ln(mv) 12,33 0.01 11,85 0,01 12,32 0,01 11,67 0,01 11,72 0,01 12,44 0,01 12,51 0,01 10,73 0,02 12,32 0,01
In -0,01 0,81
Out 0,06 0,25
InOut 0,09 0,08
Info -0,07 0,17
Oto 0,08 0,13
InOto 0,05 0,35
Clos -0,04 0,44
Closb 0,15 0,01
Hh 0,01 0,77
adjusted R2 1,56% 1,91% 2,41% 2,06% 2,19% 1,79% 1,70% 3,52% 1,56%
R2 2,11% 2,47% 2,95% 2,61% 2,74% 2,35% 2,26% 4,07% 2,12%
2015
Name Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
intercept 30,72 0,52 15,01 0,76 8,09 0,87 23,71 0,61 18,33 0,72 -5,49 0,91 47,99 0,33 68,34 0,15 14,16 0,77
ln(mv) 14,20 0.01 16,78 0,00 15,79 0,00 13,97 0,01 16,85 0,00 16,53 0,01 15,56 0,00 16,89 0,00 16,85 0,00
In 0,13 0,01
Out 0,09 0,06
InOut 0,17 0,00
Info 0,17 0,00
Oto 0,07 0,15
InOto 0,21 0,00
Clos -0,02 0,66
Closb -0,19 0,00
Hh 0,09 0,06
adjusted R2 3,81% 2,91% 5,20% 5,39% 2,52% 6,63% 2,02% 5,9% 3,91%
R2 4,33% 3,42% 5,70% 5,90% 3,05% 7,14% 2,55% 6,41% 3,44%
Table 5.3: Results of the regressions, using data from both samples, first sample and second sample. Parameter estimates that are significant
at the 5% level are shown in bold.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Through our research we mapped a systemic risk network among global financial sector
and we investigated how the centrality of the network changes over time. Furthermore we
used the network measures to predict the losses of companies during distressed periods.
In order to obtain these results, at the beginning we selected the data. We used as
proxy of global financial sector the financial companies encompassed in the STOXXr
Global 1800. We got the weekly returns of the last 10 years for a total of 406 companies.
They can be divided according sub-sector (banking, insurance, real estate companies and
financial services) and according geographical location (Asia, Europe and North America).
Then we run linear Granger causality test to measure the interdependences among
the series. We carried out the test using a bivariate VAR(1) model and we tested the
parameters at 1% significance level. We computed the network both using the data of the
whole sample and using 24-months rolling windows.
In the firs case the network presents the highest density of connections from American
companies (mainly real estate) to Asian companies whereas European companies are the
most isolated. The density of the network is 2,87%. The most central nodes are Asian
and European companies but, on average, American ones show higher centrality level.
In the second case, we found that at the beginning of the sample, during the financial
crisis, the networks present a level of density similar to the previously model. Also the
characteristics are similar. After the crisis the density falls down from 3% to a 1% and
then rises to 1,5%. This is consistent with the findings of Billio et al. (2012). In the last
model we do not find a node or a cluster of nodes that maintain the most central positions
in the networks over the sample. We analysed both most central nodes on average and
the nodes that reach the highest centrality during the sample. We found that 2 out of 9
nodes are in both groups. The companies from the first group present a centrality close to
the median centrality and their centrality degree is quite stable over the sample, whereas
the companies from the second group present high volatile centrality degrees, they can
switch fast from very high degree to low degree.
In the second part of this work we calculated some measures related to the network
and we studied whether or not they can provide any early signals about companies’ losses
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during crisis. We estimated the measures from two network antecedent to two worst
distressed periods in our sample. The measures that we computed for each node, are the
number of nodes that Granger cause the node, the number of nodes that are Granger
caused by the node, the sum of the two previously measures, the harmonic centrality,
the average closeness path that connect the node to the others, and again the first three
measures but taking in account only the nodes that do not belong to the same sector of
the node to which one the measure is referred. In addition to the network measures we
added also the logarithm of the average market capitalization.
We found that the best measures to predict the worst returns of a certain company
are the logarithm of its average market capitalization, and the sum of the companies that
Granger cause and the companies that are Granger caused by the company. Also the
closeness path gives some contribute but not as significant as the other two measures. To
sum up we can say that more a company is big and interconnected with other companies
(in both direction “cause” and “caused”), more it risks to suffer high negative returns if
a crisis arose.
In conclusion we want to highlight some aspects of our work. This work does not
claim to give an comprehensive assessment of systemic risk but only to give some con-
tribution about how spillovers spread in financial sector and where companies are more
connected. To face this problem we used the concept of linear Granger causality but many
other approach could be used. For example it would be possible to study the causality
through the standardized innovations of the series or carrying out variance decomposition
of forecast errors in order to individuate which series influence which ones. In the further
researches, it would be interesting to compare the results of this work with the results
obtained applying other approaches on the same data used throughout this work in order
to robustness of the network developed in this work.
Appendix A
List of the companies
Company’s name Geo-Sector Currency Yearly avg Return Yearly St.D
COMMONWEALTH BK OF AUS APB A$ 0,0226 0,1087
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINL GP APB Y -0,0246 0,1737
WESTPAC BANKING APB A$ 0,0136 0,1156
NATIONAL AUS BANK APB A$ -0,0063 0,1197
SUMITOMO MITSUI FINL GP APB Y -0,0384 0,184
MIZUHO FINL GP APB Y -0,0538 0,1787
DBS GROUP HOLDINGS APB S$ 0,004 0,1161
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK APB S$ 0,0031 0,1103
OVERSEA CHINESE BKG APB S$ 0,0065 0,0981
AUS AND NZ BANKING GP APB A$ 0,004 0,1206
HANG SENG BANK APB K$ 0,0166 0,1191
SUMITOMO MITSUI TST HDG APB Y -0,0446 0,1954
RESONA HOLDINGS APB Y -0,0636 0,1755
CONCORDIA FINANCIAL GP APB Y 0,0913 0,1675
BANK OF EAST ASIA APB K$ -0,0055 0,1524
CHIBA BANK APB Y -0,0126 0,1563
SHIZUOKA BANK APB Y -0,0084 0,1322
SURUGA BANK APB Y 0,0195 0,1528
JAPAN POST BANK APB Y -0,0494 0,1261
MEBUKI FINANCIAL GROUP APB Y 0,018 0,1442
BENDIGO ADELAIDE BANK APB A$ -0,0033 0,1352
AOZORA BANK APB Y -0,0022 0,1753
FUKUOKA FINANCIAL GP APB Y -0,0241 0,166
BANK OF QLND APB A$ -0,0087 0,1379
SHINSEI BANK APB Y -0,0438 0,2153
HACHIJUNI BANK APB Y -0,0062 0,1321
KYUSHU FINANCIAL GP APB Y -0,0381 0,1551
BANK OF KYOTO APB Y -0,0134 0,1415
CHUGOKU BANK APB Y 0,0068 0,1194
HIROSHIMA BANK APB Y -0,0099 0,1444
YAMAGUCHI FINLGP APB Y -0,0064 0,147
GUNMA BANK APB Y -0,0073 0,1444
HOKUHOKU FINL GP APB Y -0,0315 0,1535
IYO BANK APB Y -0,0143 0,1261
SEVEN BANK APB Y 0,0324 0,1355
BANK 77 APB Y -0,0168 0,1461
NISHI NIPPON FINLHDG APB Y 0,1728 0,0909
HONG KONG EXS CLEAR APFS K$ 0,043 0,1828
NOMURA HDG APFS Y -0,0466 0,1976
MACQUARIE GROUP APFS A$ 0,0057 0,1769
ORIX APFS Y -0,0231 0,2367
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SUNCORP GROUP APFS A$ -0,0137 0,1378
DAIWA SECURITIES GROUP APFS Y -0,0267 0,1763
JAPAN EXCHANGE GROUP APFS Y 0,0411 0,1999
ASX APFS A$ 0,0102 0,1086
SINGAPORE EXCHANGE APFS S$ 0,0087 0,1435
CREDIT SAISON APFS Y -0,0213 0,2089
MITSUBUFJ LSE FINANCE APFS Y 0,0061 0,1883
SBI HDG APFS Y -0,0396 0,2248
AEON FINANCIAL SERVICE APFS Y 0,0043 0,193
MAGELLAN FINANCIAL GP APFS A$ 0,1148 0,19
ACOM APFS Y 0,006 0,2272
NIHON MeA CENTER APFS Y 0,0798 0,1984
TOKYO CENTURY APFS Y 0,0385 0,1956
IOOF HOLDINGS APFS A$ -0,0025 0,1515
PERPETUAL APFS A$ -0,0152 0,1558
ZENKOKU HOSHO APFS Y 0,176 0,1899
AIA GROUP API K$ 0,0509 0,0969
TOKIO MARINE HOLDINGS API Y 0,0071 0,1699
DAI ICHI LIFE HOLDINGS API Y 0,0206 0,1784
MSAD INSURANCE GPHDG API Y -0,0084 0,1718
SOMPO HOLDINGS API Y 0,0262 0,1459
QBE INSURANCE GROUP API A$ -0,0354 0,1445
AMP API A$ -0,0265 0,1217
INSURANCE AUSGROUP API A$ 0,0024 0,1094
T D HOLDINGS API Y -0,0328 0,1923
JAPAN POST HOLDINGS API Y -0,0486 0,1234
MEDIBANK PRIVATE API A$ 0,053 0,1124
CHALLENGER API A$ 0,0399 0,1787
SONY FINANCIAL HOLDINGS API Y -0,0011 0,1615
MITSUBISHI ESTATE APRE Y -0,0204 0,1694
MITSUI FUDOSAN APRE Y -0,009 0,1777
SUN HUNG KAI PROPERTIES APRE K$ 0,0095 0,1424
CHEUNG KONG PRHDG APRE K$ -0,0602 0,1381
SCENTRE GROUP APRE A$ 0,0495 0,0829
LINK RLESTINVTST APRE K$ 0,0475 0,0905
WESTFIELD APRE A$ -0,0059 0,1115
SUMITOMO REALDEV APRE Y -0,0151 0,2018
DAITO TSTCONSTRUCTION APRE Y 0,0436 0,1266
WHARF HOLDINGS APRE K$ 0,038 0,1708
GOODMAN GROUP APRE A$ -0,0564 0,2708
STOCKLAND APRE A$ -0,0206 0,1449
HONG KONG LAND HDG APRE U$ 0,0201 0,1309
NIPPON BUILDING FUND APRE Y -0,011 0,1352
VICINITY CENTRES APRE A$ 0,0407 0,073
JAPAN REAL ESTATE INV APRE Y -0,0061 0,1399
DEXUS PROPERTY GROUP APRE A$ 0,0005 0,1432
LENDLEASE GROUP APRE A$ -0,0054 0,1181
NEW WORLD DEV APRE K$ -0,0118 0,1873
CAPITALAND APRE S$ -0,018 0,152
MIRVAC GROUP APRE A$ -0,0317 0,1923
GPT GROUP APRE A$ -0,0515 0,2134
NOMURA RLSTMASTER FUND APRE Y 0,0262 0,1042
HENDERSON LDDEV APRE K$ 0,0179 0,143
GLOBAL LOGISTIC PROPS APRE S$ 0,0139 0,1112
WHEELOCK AND CO APRE K$ 0,0491 0,1678
JAPAN RETFDINV APRE Y -0,0038 0,1518
SINO LAND APRE K$ -0,0041 0,1824
HULIC APRE Y -0,0428 0,2137
UNITED URBINV APRE Y 0,0036 0,1383
ORIX JREIT APRE Y -0,002 0,1503
ADVANCE RESIDENCE INV APRE Y 0,0584 0,097
HANG LUNG GROUP APRE K$ 0,0098 0,1471
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JAPAN PRIME REALTY INV APRE Y -0,0006 0,166
CAPITALAND MALL TRUST APRE S$ -0,0114 0,1741
DAIWA HOUSE REIT INV APRE Y 0,0194 0,1898
NIPPON PROLOGIS REIT APRE Y 0,0612 0,107
SWIRE PROPERTIES APRE K$ 0,0269 0,0899
ASCENDAS REAL ESTATE IT APRE S$ 0,0055 0,1293
HANG LUNG PROPERTIES APRE K$ 0,0004 0,1625
TOKYO TATEMONO APRE Y -0,0285 0,2419
IIDA GROUP HOLDINGS APRE Y -0,0191 0,1657
TOKYU FUDOSAN HOLDINGS APRE Y -0,0485 0,139
ACTIVIA PROPERTIES APRE Y 0,079 0,1019
HYSAN DEVELOPMENT APRE K$ 0,0238 0,1342
GLP J REIT APRE Y 0,0709 0,0953
CITY DEVELOPMENTS APRE S$ -0,0121 0,1424
JAPAN HOTEL REIT INV APRE Y 0,0247 0,188
HOPEWELL HOLDINGS APRE K$ 0,001 0,1116
UOL GROUP APRE S$ 0,0149 0,1254
KENEDIX OFFICE INV APRE Y -0,0058 0,2312
SUNTEC RLSTIT APRE S$ -0,0007 0,1191
CAPITALAND COMLTST APRE S$ -0,0068 0,1472
NOMURA RLSTHDG APRE Y -0,0309 0,1837
REA GROUP APRE A$ 0,0989 0,1411
NIPPON ACCOMMSFD APRE Y 0,01 0,1268
FRONTIER RLSTINV APRE Y -0,0044 0,1296
INVESTA OFFICE FUND APRE A$ -0,0066 0,187
MORI HILLS REIT INV APRE Y -0,0117 0,1461
KERRY PROPERTIES APRE K$ -0,0147 0,1848
JAPAN LOGISTICS FUND APRE Y 0,0102 0,1267
INDL INFRFUND INV APRE Y 0,0367 0,1334
AEON MALL APRE Y -0,0251 0,1797
MORI TRUST SOGO REIT APRE Y -0,0183 0,1325
DAIWA OFFICE INVESTMENT APRE Y -0,009 0,2034
RELO GROUP APRE Y 0,0813 0,1682
LEOPALACE21 APRE Y -0,0735 0,2598
HSBC HDG EUB £ -0,0066 0,132
BANCO SANTANDER EUB E -0,0175 0,1658
BNP PARIBAS EUB E -0,0103 0,1838
UBS GROUP EUB SF -0,0553 0,1937
ING GROEP EUB E -0,0228 0,2326
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP EUB £ -0,0574 0,2444
BARCLAYS EUB £ -0,0421 0,2373
BBVARGENTARIA EUB E -0,0296 0,1685
NORDEA BANK EUB SK 0,0112 0,1409
SOCIETE GENERALE EUB E -0,0366 0,2234
INTESA SANPAOLO EUB E -0,0318 0,196
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP N EUB SF -0,0659 0,1851
DEUTSCHE BANK EUB E -0,0631 0,1939
DANSKE BANK EUB DK 0,0008 0,1701
STANDARD CHARTERED EUB £ -0,0165 0,1903
SWEDBANK A EUB SK 0,0046 0,184
SVENSKA HANDBKN EUB SK 0,0266 0,132
SEB A EUB SK -0,0025 0,1766
KBC GROUP EUB E -0,0164 0,2655
DNB EUB NK 0,0241 0,1651
CREDIT AGRICOLE EUB E -0,0332 0,2023
CAIXABANK EUB E -0,0071 0,142
JULIUS BAR GRUPPE EUB SF 0,024 0,13
ROYAL BANK OF SCTLGP EUB £ -0,1242 0,3361
ERSTE GROUP BANK EUB E -0,0257 0,2185
COMMERZBANK EUB E -0,1234 0,2308
BANCO DE SABADELL EUB E -0,0531 0,1656
UNICREDIT EUB E -0,1006 0,2438
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BANK OF IRELAND EUB E -0,1479 0,4023
ABN AMRO GROUP EUB E 0,0687 0,1406
NATIXIS EUB E -0,0279 0,2373
MEDIOBANCA BCFIN EUB E -0,0267 0,1719
BANKINTER R EUB E 0,0047 0,1702
BANCO BPM EUB E -0,1387 0,25
BANKIA EUB E -0,2475 0,5063
JYSKE BANK EUB DK -0,0021 0,1552
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL EUB E -0,1372 0,1975
CYBG EUB £ 0,1091 0,1875
UNIONE DI BCAITAN EUB E -0,0701 0,1837
KOMERCNI BANKA EUB CK 0,0153 0,149
RAIFFEISEN BANK INTL EUB E -0,0592 0,2171
SYDBANK EUB DK -0,0057 0,1613
BPER BANCA EUB E -0,0544 0,1916
CEMBRA MONEY BANK N ORD EUB SF 0,0501 0,0721
INVESTOR B EUFS SK 0,0342 0,1135
DEUTSCHE BOERSE EUFS E 0,0011 0,1488
LONDON STOCK EXGROUP EUFS £ 0,042 0,1659
PARTNERS GROUP HOLDING EUFS SF 0,0599 0,1357
KINNEVIK B EUFS SK 0,0334 0,1522
EXOR ORD EUFS E 0,1089 0,1603
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL EUFS £ 0,0482 0,1234
INVESTEC EUFS £ 0,0001 0,1697
SCHRODERS EUFS £ 0,0454 0,1578
HARGREAVES LANSDOWN EUFS £ 0,094 0,1566
INDUSTRIVARDEN A EUFS SK 0,0141 0,1399
WENDEL EUFS E -0,0002 0,1936
ABERDEEN ASSET MAN EUFS £ 0,0198 0,1606
HENDERSON GROUP EUFS £ 0,0195 0,1842
MAN GROUP EUFS £ -0,0522 0,2129
CLOSE BROTHERS GROUP EUFS £ 0,0159 0,1395
INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GP EUFS £ -0,0007 0,1918
T3I GROUP EUFS £ 0,0009 0,1737
GBL NEW EUFS E 0,0002 0,0951
INTRUM JUSTITIA EUFS SK 0,0555 0,1351
JUPITER FUND MANAGEMENT EUFS £ 0,0523 0,1353
PARGESA B EUFS SF -0,0237 0,1212
AAREAL BANK EUFS E 0,0069 0,2279
IG GROUP HOLDINGS EUFS £ 0,0291 0,168
BOLSAS Y MERCADOS ESPANOLES EUFS E -0,007 0,1362
NEX GROUP EUFS £ 0,0109 0,177
EURONEXT EUFS E 0,1282 0,1294
AZIMUT HOLDING EUFS E 0,023 0,191
ACKERMANS VAN HAAREN EUFS E 0,0328 0,1182
ALLIANZ XET EUI E 0,003 0,1479
PRUDENTIAL EUI £ 0,0398 0,1717
AXA EUI E -0,0101 0,1947
ZURICH INSURANCE GROUP EUI SF -0,0072 0,1377
SWISS RE EUI SF -0,0066 0,177
MUENCHENER RUCK XET EUI E 0,0186 0,1102
AVIVA EUI £ -0,0164 0,1997
SAMPO A EUI E 0,0312 0,1205
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI EUI E -0,0282 0,1312
LEGAL GENERAL EUI £ 0,0226 0,1875
OLD MUTUAL EUI £ 0,0123 0,1784
NN GROUP EUI E 0,0457 0,1024
SWISS LIFE HOLDING EUI SF 0,0107 0,1603
AEGON EUI E -0,037 0,2152
STANDARD LIFE EUI £ 0,0131 0,1576
AGEAS EX FORTIS EUI E -0,0788 0,3117
RSA INSURANCE GROUP EUI £ -0,0058 0,1219
49
STJAMESS PLACE EUI £ 0,0396 0,1598
HANNOVER RUCK XET EUI E 0,053 0,146
BALOISE HOLDING AG EUI SF 0,0044 0,1325
DIRECT LINE INGROUP EUI £ 0,06 0,0907
SCOR SE EUI E 0,0271 0,1221
ADMIRAL GROUP EUI £ 0,0254 0,1345
HISCOX DI EUI £ 0,0571 0,1028
PHOENIX GROUP HDG EUI £ 0,0103 0,1111
HELVETIA HOLDING N EUI SF 0,0098 0,143
MAPFRE EUI E -0,0077 0,1487
STOREBRAND EUI NK -0,0063 0,2247
GJENSIDIGE FORSIKRING EUI NK 0,0562 0,0885
POSTE ITALIANE EUI E -0,0119 0,1344
CNP ASSURANCES EUI E -0,0043 0,1466
BEAZLEY EUI £ 0,0473 0,127
DELTA LLOYD GROUP EUI E -0,0314 0,1811
UNIPOLSAI EUI E -0,1241 0,3032
TRYG EUI DK 0,0179 0,1128
TOPDANMARK EUI DK 0,0252 0,1122
UNIBAIL RODAMCO EURE E 0,006 0,1207
VONOVIA EURE E 0,0767 0,1161
DEUTSCHE WOHNEN BRSHS EURE E 0,0113 0,2086
LAND SECURITIES GROUP EURE £ -0,0217 0,1418
BRITISH LAND EURE £ -0,0268 0,1313
KLEPIERRE EURE E -0,0109 0,156
SWISS PRIME SITE EURE SF 0,0195 0,0749
HAMMERSON EURE £ -0,0222 0,1437
LEG IMMOBILIEN EURE E 0,0605 0,0941
SEGRO EURE £ -0,0381 0,1635
GECINA EURE E -0,0074 0,1554
MERLIN PROPERTIES EURE E 0,0521 0,1032
CASTELLUM EURE SK 0,0184 0,1403
PSP SWISS PROPERTY AG EURE SF 0,0208 0,0862
DERWENT LONDON EURE £ 0,0131 0,1501
INTU PROPERTIES EURE £ -0,0416 0,1388
ICADE EURE E -0,0235 0,1407
GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES EURE £ 0,0081 0,1546
SHAFTESBURY EURE £ 0,0206 0,1222
FONCIERE DES REGIONS EURE E -0,0202 0,1456
CAPITAL CNTSPROPS EURE £ 0,0488 0,1133
FABEGE EURE SK 0,0241 0,1673
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN B EURE SK 0,0416 0,1076
BUWOG EURE E 0,0773 0,0854
JM EURE SK 0,016 0,1873
COFINIMMO EURE E -0,0138 0,0874
FASTIGHETS BALDER B EURE SK 0,1048 0,1415
DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP EURE E 0,0159 0,103
WERELDHAVE EURE E -0,029 0,1129
IMMOFINANZ EURE E -0,0668 0,2542
JP MORGAN CHASE CO NAB U$ 0,0278 0,1783
WELLS FARGO CO NAB U$ 0,0229 0,186
BANK OF AMERICA NAB U$ -0,0277 0,2576
CITIGROUP NAB U$ -0,0837 0,2798
US BANCORP NAB U$ 0,019 0,1583
PNC FINLSVSGP NAB U$ 0,0243 0,1679
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA NAB C$ 0,0248 0,1064
TORONTO DOMINION BANK NAB C$ 0,0306 0,1026
BKOF NOVA SCOTIA NAB C$ 0,0201 0,1051
BANK OF MONTREAL NAB C$ 0,0166 0,1099
BBT NAB U$ 0,0069 0,1585
CANADIAN IMPBKCOM NAB C$ 0,0078 0,118
SUNTRUST BANKS NAB U$ -0,014 0,2236
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MT BANK NAB U$ 0,015 0,1538
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP NAB U$ -0,0148 0,2793
KEYCORP NAB U$ -0,0273 0,2157
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP NAB U$ 0,089 0,1273
REGIONS FINLNEW NAB U$ -0,0337 0,2731
HUNTINGTON BCSH NAB U$ -0,0185 0,2826
NATBKOF CANADA NAB C$ 0,0251 0,1139
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK NAB U$ 0,088 0,1051
COMERICA NAB U$ 0,0094 0,1861
SIGNATURE BANK NAB U$ 0,0721 0,1505
NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANC NAB U$ -0,005 0,131
VISA A NAFS U$ 0,0864 0,1254
MASTERCARD NAFS U$ 0,1049 0,1452
GOLDMAN SACHS GP NAFS U$ 0,0118 0,1633
MORGAN STANLEY NAFS U$ -0,0101 0,2257
AMERICAN EXPRESS NAFS U$ 0,0155 0,1658
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON NAFS U$ 0,0059 0,1541
CHARLES SCHWAB NAFS U$ 0,0366 0,1607
CAPITAL ONE FINL NAFS U$ 0,0093 0,2203
BLACKROCK NAFS U$ 0,0396 0,1654
CME GROUP NAFS U$ 0,0047 0,1755
SP GLOBAL NAFS U$ 0,0303 0,1454
INTERCONTINENTAL EX NAFS U$ 0,0324 0,1824
BROOKFIELD ASSET MANA NAFS U$ 0,0217 0,1389
STATE STREET NAFS U$ 0,0089 0,1956
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL NAFS U$ 0,0726 0,1257
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SVS NAFS U$ 0,0376 0,1774
AMERIPRISE FINL NAFS U$ 0,0365 0,1701
MOODYS NAFS U$ 0,0233 0,1834
NORTHERN TRUST NAFS U$ 0,017 0,1361
T ROWE PRICE GROUP NAFS U$ 0,0196 0,1569
FRANKLIN RESOURCES NAFS U$ 0,0054 0,1583
EQUIFAX NAFS U$ 0,0549 0,109
IHS MARKIT NAFS U$ 0,0667 0,0888
INVESCO NAFS U$ 0,0062 0,1873
LIBERTY BROADBAND SRA NAFS U$ 0,1188 0,1055
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING NAFS U$ 0,0402 0,1484
ALLY FINANCIAL NAFS U$ -0,02 0,1304
FIDELITY NATFINANCIAL NAFS U$ 0,0283 0,1686
ETRADE FINANCIAL NAFS U$ -0,0736 0,314
RAYMOND JAMES FINL NAFS U$ 0,0432 0,1773
NASDAQ NAFS U$ 0,0404 0,171
WESTERN UNION NAFS U$ -0,0026 0,1451
AFFILIATED MANAGERS NAFS U$ 0,0194 0,2051
MSCI NAFS U$ 0,06 0,1683
CIT GROUP NAFS U$ 0,0239 0,1303
VOYA FINANCIAL NAFS U$ 0,0757 0,1282
SEI INVESTMENTS NAFS U$ 0,0236 0,1439
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY A NAI U$ 0,0383 0,0943
AMERICAN INTLGP NAI U$ -0,1138 0,3918
CHUBB NAI U$ 0,0391 0,1108
METLIFE NAI U$ -0,0056 0,1954
PRUDENTIAL FINL NAI U$ 0,0094 0,2157
MARSH MCLENNAN NAI U$ 0,0397 0,0972
MANULIFE FINANCIAL NAI C$ -0,0189 0,1769
TRAVELERS COS NAI U$ 0,037 0,1032
AON CLASS A NAI U$ 0,048 0,0975
ALLSTATE NAI U$ 0,0134 0,1356
AFLAC NAI U$ 0,0185 0,1883
SUN LIFE FINL NAI C$ -0,0013 0,1511
PROGRESSIVE OHIO NAI U$ 0,0236 0,1166
HARTFORD FINLSVSGP NAI U$ -0,0269 0,2767
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PRINCIPAL FINLGP NAI U$ 0,0028 0,2132
WILLIS TOWERS WATSON NAI U$ 0,0091 0,1148
LINCOLN NATIONAL NAI U$ 0,0016 0,2703
LOEWS NAI U$ 0,0049 0,1227
MARKEL NAI U$ 0,0305 0,1204
UNUM GROUP NAI U$ 0,0355 0,1572
CINCINNATI FINL NAI U$ 0,0229 0,1119
XL GROUP NAI U$ -0,0231 0,2577
FAIRFAX FINLHDG NAI C$ 0,0426 0,1137
ARCH CAPGP NAI U$ 0,0629 0,0906
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER NAI U$ 0,0292 0,0994
ALLEGHANY NAI U$ 0,0256 0,1118
INTACT FINANCIAL NAI C$ 0,026 0,1001
POWER CORPCANADA NAI C$ -0,0067 0,1189
TORCHMARK NAI U$ 0,0431 0,1407
GREAT WEST LIFECO NAI C$ 0,0015 0,1203
EVEREST RE GP NAI U$ 0,0381 0,0985
POWER FINL NAI C$ -0,0039 0,1145
SIMON PROPERTY GROUP NARE U$ 0,0254 0,1663
AMERICAN TOWER NARE U$ 0,048 0,1176
PUBLIC STORAGE NARE U$ 0,0372 0,1381
CROWN CASTLE INTL NARE U$ 0,0467 0,1473
EQUINIX NARE U$ 0,0702 0,1668
PROLOGIS NARE U$ -0,0045 0,2159
WEYERHAEUSER NARE U$ -0,0012 0,1527
AVALONBAY COMMNS NARE U$ 0,0158 0,1478
WELLTOWER NARE U$ 0,0197 0,1258
EQUITY RESDTSTPROPS SHBI NARE U$ 0,0121 0,1591
VENTAS NARE U$ 0,0217 0,1527
BOSTON PROPERTIES NARE U$ 0,0073 0,1528
VORNADO REALTY TRUST NARE U$ 0,0008 0,1612
REALTY INCOME NARE U$ 0,035 0,1404
DIGITAL REALTY TST NARE U$ 0,0452 0,1465
ESSEX PROPERTY TST NARE U$ 0,0256 0,1374
HCP NARE U$ -0,0002 0,1607
GGP NARE U$ -0,0242 0,4009
HOST HOTELS RESORTS NARE U$ -0,0102 0,2004
CBRE GROUP CLASS A NARE U$ 0,0055 0,2551
MID AMERAPT COMMUNITIES NARE U$ 0,0281 0,1505
SL GREEN REALTY NARE U$ -0,0081 0,2316
ANNALY CAPITAL MAN NARE U$ -0,0092 0,1194
KIMCO REALTY NARE U$ -0,0291 0,1902
FEDERAL REALTY INVTST NARE U$ 0,0183 0,1438
EXTRA SPACE STRG NARE U$ 0,0632 0,1607
IRON MOUNTAIN NARE U$ 0,0195 0,1432
UDR NARE U$ 0,007 0,149
ALEXANDRIA RLSTEQTIES NARE U$ 0,0064 0,159
MACERICH NARE U$ -0,0091 0,2398
DUKE REALTY NARE U$ -0,0205 0,209
VEREIT NARE U$ -0,0278 0,134
REGENCY CENTERS NARE U$ -0,0075 0,1692
CAMDEN PROPERTY TST NARE U$ 0,0074 0,1636
RIOCAN REITTST NARE C$ 0,0011 0,0961
NATIONAL RETAIL PROPS NARE U$ 0,0273 0,1373
AGNC INVESTMENT NARE U$ 0,00 0,1169
Table A.1: List of the companies as nodes of the network. About the geo-sector AP
means Asian Pacific, EU Europe, NA North America; B Bank, FS Financial Services, I
Insurances and RE Real Estate. About the currency A$ is Australian Dollar, Y is Yen, S$
is Singapore Dollar, K$ is Honk Kong Dollar, £ is Pound, E is Euro, SF is Swiss Franc,
SK is Swedish Krona, NK is Norwegian Krona, DK is Danish Krona, CK Czech Krona,
U$ is American Dollar and C$ Canadian Dollar
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Appendix B
Static model using exchange rate as
background factor
AB
AI
AFS
ARE
EB
EI
EFS
ERE
NB
NI
NFS
NRE
Granger causality at 1% of significativity
Figure B.1: Representation of the adjacency matrix related to the model whit exchange
rate as background factor. The red lines delimit the different groups.
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Higher 5% of dangerous companies for number of connection (exc. rate)
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Figure B.2: Number of connections for each company (exchange rate)
Higher 5% of dangerous companies for amount of euro (exc. rate)
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Figure B.3: Amount of euros influenced by each company (exchange rate)
Higher 5% of dangerous companies for euro ratio their capitalization (exc. rate)
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Figure B.4: Amount of Euros connected to each company over market capitalization
(exchange rate)
Appendix C
Adjacency matrices of dynamic
model
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2009
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2009
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2010
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2010
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2010
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2011
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2011
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2012
60 APPENDIX C. ADJACENCY MATRICES OF DYNAMIC MODEL
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2012
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2012
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2013
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2013
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2013
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2014
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2014
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2015
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2015
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2015
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Apr-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
May-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jun-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jul-2016
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ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Aug-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Sep-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Oct-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Nov-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Dec-2016
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Jan-2017
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Feb-2017
ABA IFSARE EBE IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
ABA IAFS
ARE
EB
E IEFSERENBNINFSNRE
Mar-2017
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